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RAISING THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AGAINST
URBAN RENEWAL: SUBALTERN STATUS FOR
PLANNERS?
Telling of the reverence our society has accorded traditional forms
of religious worship is the fact that until 1973 no religious group had
sought the protection of our courts against the state for an existing
house of worship., In Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Author-
ity - the issue of whether a church structure that is sui generis3 can be
condemned under the state's power of eminent domain was raised for
the first time.
The Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) notified Pillar of
Fire that Memorial Hall, the birthplace and first permanent structure
of the faith, would be condemned to make way for an office building
unless the church agreed to underwrite the development of the entire
block upon which Memorial Hall stands.4 Unable to secure financial
backing for such a development, Pillar of Fire sought to defeat
DURA's petition to condemn the building. In an original proceeding,
the Supreme Court of Colorado held that Pillar of Fire had raised an
1. It is possible, of course, that cases have been brought at the state trial court
level although prior to 1973 none had been officially reported.
2 ............. Colo ............. , 509 P.2d 1250 (1973).
3. See note 11 infra.
4. Pillar of Fire, an evangelistic offshoot of Methodism, presently maintains
churches in 18 states and several foreign countries. Memorial Hall was constructed
in 1903, and the trial court found that the building is in good repair. Brief for
Appellant for Petition in Original Jurisdiction at 10 ........ Colo . .............. 509
P.2d 1250 (1973). A highly persuasive argument may be made by petitioner on re-
mand that if DURA had been willing to allow Memorial Hall to stand had Pillar
of Fire undertaken the development of the rest of the block, then DURA cannot
logically claim that Memorial Hall impedes DURA's plans for the renewal area in
the event that Pillar of Fire cannot develop the block.
It was estimated that the development envisioned by DURA would cost at
least 25 million dollars and that the developer should expect to operate at a deficit
for eight or nine years. Although the court made no mention of the propriety of
DURA's proposal, it would seem singularly inappropriate to condition the exist-
ence of a house of worship on whether the religious organization is prepared to
assume the function of a real estate developer. It is an ironical usage that allows
us to speak of condemning (from damnare) churches in the first place.
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issue under the first amendment's protection of the free exercise of
religion and remanded the case to the district court for a balancing
of the interests of church and state.5 Had the court spumed the
church's attempt to invoke the first amendment, petitioner's efforts to
obtain judicial review of the condemnation proceeding would have
been precluded by Berman v. Parker, the leading case involving sub-
stantive review of a redevelopment authority's administrative decisions.
There, the Supreme Court rejected appellants' petition for review of
an administrative decision because:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary,
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation....
Once the object is within the authority of Congress . . the
means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to deter-
mine.7
By finding in Pillar of Fire that a first amendment right was in-
volved, the court shifted to DURA the burden of showing, on remand,
that no reasonable alternative to condemnation exists, that the site of
the church is so vital to the overall renewal plan that petitioner's
property should be condemned.8 The significance of the Pillar of Fire
Jlecision lies partly in its allowing petitioner to transfer the burden of
proof to DURA, rendering inapplicable the presumption of validity
that normally attends legislative acts0 in the courts.' 0
Although the holding of Pillar of Fire is limited, arguably, to church
structures that are sui generis, the decision marks the way for future
5 ............. Colo. at ............. 509 P.2d at 1251, 1253.
6. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
7. Id. at 32-33.
8 ............. Colo. at ............. 509 P.2d at 1253, 1254.
9. Pillar of Fire was challenging the application, not the constitutionality, of
the statute that created DURA. A regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); see
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1, 8-9 (1944).
10. The presumption is neutralized in the face of first amendment claims. See
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Valent v.
Board of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 78, 274 A.2d 832, 840 (Ch. Div. 1971).
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challenges by religious groups when urban renewal authorities seek to
condemn church buildings that are not clearly sui generis in nature.:1
The court indicated that churches normally are not immune from
condemnation under the power of eminent domain. "[qhurch prop-
erty is private property which can be taken by eminent domain for
paramount public use .. .." 2 An examination of the four cases cited
in support of this proposition reveals, however, that the immunity issue
has not been resolved conclusively with respect to church buildings.
Macon 6 Atlantic Railway v. Riggs" is one of only two cases cited
by the court in which the taking of church property was at issue. The
pertinent language of the opinion is clearly dictum in view of the
court's holding that respondent could not enter the property.14 In
11. Sui generis means "of its own kind or class." B.Acx's LAW DICTIONARY
1602 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). It is not as if churches within the definition will have
sui generis embossed on their portals, however, and it may prove extremely dif-
ficult to determine whether church structures are sui generis for the purposes of
first amendment protection. The Pillar of Fire court used the term in reference
to the unique historical and symbolic importance of Memorial Hall to the Pillar
of Fire faith. Within this frame of reference the claim that a church is sui generis
could arise if a synagogue were designed by Chagall, or even where a congrega-
tion feels a strong spiritual affinity toward the church in which they have wor-
shipped for a number of years. Viewed microcosmically-and no legal principle
compels us to increase the angle of vision-the ordinary neighborhood church,
the church building itself, may have unique historical and symbolic significance
for its congregation-to them it may be of its own kind or class. What the Pillar
of Fire court would protect is the faith that adheres to the church building; and
as the Mormon Tabernacle stands in relation to the faith of Mormons, so may
the nondescript First Baptist Church on Elm Street stand in relation to the faith
of its congregation.
It should further be mentioned that slum areas, which by definition are candi-
dates for renewal projects, may present unusual problems for urban planners in
the form of unaffiliated, singular and, by any measure, uniquely symbolic churches.
In his characterization of Harlem's religious community, Kenneth Clark observes
that "many storefront churches . . .and . . . sporadic Negro quasireligious cult
groups" exist in the area. K. CLARK, DARx GHETTO: DiLFmsxAS OF SOCIAL POWER
174 (1965). It would not be surprising if many of these wayward, offshoot
churches could pass muster under Pillar of Fire's sui generis requirement, and it
would be a hapless court indeed that deigned to make the distinction between
the Pillar of Fire and the evangelical sects that command great respect in ghetto
areas.
12 ............. Colo  at ............. 509 P.2d at 1254.
13. 87 Ga. 158, 13 S.E. 312 (1891).
14. The court said: "[C]hurch property is private property, and it follows
that land belonging to a church may be condemned for public use.., just as the
property of an individual may be." Id. at 159, 13 S.E. at 312.
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Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora,' in which the land to be
taken was part of a cemetery (the parcel not yet used for burial pur-
poses), the court stated: "It is not to be said that such lands, by virtue
of their sacred nature, are placed beyond the reach of the power of
eminent domain . . . ."16 In view of the court's holding that Aurora
could not proceed for immediate possession of the property, the lan-
guage must be seen as dictum.1 7 Welch v. City & County of Denver's
dealt not with religious property but with city pardands, and so the
court's expansive statement that "there are no limitations on the type
of property that can be acquired by the State . . . for highway pur-
poses "19 should be viewed within its context. A similar case is Mack v.
Board of County Commissioners,2 ° in which the state was allowed to
condemn part of a private airfield in favor of a highway. Like Welch,
the case is extremely weak precedent because no first amendment issue
was presented, and here, in fact, even the dictum does not support the
Pillar of Fire court's pronouncement. The Mack court stated: [I]t is
dear that subject to rare exceptions, it is the general rule that there are
no limitations on the type of property that may be acquired by the
state .... '21 What constitutes those rare exceptions would likely be
the issue in a case involving church property that is not sui generis
in nature.
Clearly, the Pillar of Fire court failed to adequately substantiate its
statement that, ordinarily, church property is private property for the
purposes of eminent domain. It is instructive, therefore, to examine
cases in other areas of law, and in other jurisdictions, to determine
whether-and if so, under what circumstances-first amendment pro.
tections are applicable to religious property.22
15. 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732 (1952).
16. Id. at 275, 248 P.2d at 736.
17. As the court itself noted: "Much of what has been said concerning these
questions may rightfully be considered as dictum, because the opinions expressed as
to these questions are not necessary to the decision of the exact question before
us ... ." Id. at 276, 248 P.2d at 736-37. But see note 28 and accompanying text
infra.
18. 141 Colo. 587, 349 P.2d 352 (1960).
19. Id. at 592-93, 349 P.2d at 355.
20. 152 Colo. 300, 381 P.2d 987 (1963).
21. Id. at 303, 381 P.2d at 988 (emphasis added).
22. Although no cases were found involving the taking of church property
under the police powers of the state, it should be noted that the state's burden is
[Vol. 8:219
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The further one ranges from the taking of an actual church edifice,
the fewer obstacles there are to the taking. Land leased by a church
and utilized as a garage can be taken for school purposes;23 vacant
church land can be taken by eminent domain 24 or adverse possession; 25
the unused portion of a church cemetery can be condemned under
the power of eminent domain;26 formerly used but abandoned church
cemeteries can be taken; 27 and it is well-established that church ceme-
teries can be taken under eminent domain, even when they are still
in use.28 However strong the precedent for taking certain kinds of
church property, it is by no means settled that church buildings them-
selves may be condemned under the power of eminent domain.
There are no reported cases involving the taking of a church edifice
by condemnation proceedings, but Ashworth v. Brown,29 in which a
church's request for injunctive relief against a trespasser under a false
claim of title was granted, weighs heavily against the instant court's
pronouncement on church property. In deciding that equitable relief
should be granted to prohibit the dismantling and destruction of the
substantially reduced when constitutional claims collide with state police powers.
See Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 2d 552, 557, 254 P.2d 865,
867 (1953): "[T]he very essence of the police power as differentiated from the
power of eminent domain is that the deprivation of individual rights and property
cannot prevent its operation, once it is shown that its exercise is proper and that
the method of its exercise is reasonably within the meaning of due process of law."
Accord, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws consti-
tutional as applied against Saturday sabbatarians); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor laws applicable to religious groups); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (statute outlawing polygamy upheld).
23. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 3 N.J. Misc. 349,
128 A. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
24. Chambers v. Arizona, 82 Ariz. 278, 284, 312 P.2d 155, 159 (1957) (dic-
tum).
25. Thompson v. Bowes, 115 Me. 6, 97 A. 1 (1916).
26. St. James African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
114 Md. 442, 79 A. 35 (1911); Rittenhouse v. Creasy, 12 Luz. Reg. 14 (C.P.
Pa. 1882).
27. City of New Orleans v. Christ Church Corp., 228 La. 184, 81 So. 2d 855
(1955).
28. In re Application of the Bd. of Street Opening, 133 N.Y. 329, 31 N.E.
102 (1892). "The fact that lands have previously been devoted to cemetery
purposes does not place them beyond the reach of the power of eminent domain."
Id. at 333, 31 N.E. at 103. See generally Note, Cemetery Land Use and the Urban
Planner, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 181 (1974).
29. 240 Ala. 164, 198 So. 135 (1940).
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church, the Supreme Court of Alabama discerned a direct link be-
tween the church building and the free exercise of religion.
Religious freedom is fundamental in this country. ... It need
merely to be announced when this right is invaded. Incident to
this is the right of assembly for religious worship ....
To this end a spot of ground may be acquired, a building may
be erected, both dedicated to religious uses. The right to their
uninterrupted and continuous use as a place of worship, for
preaching, teaching, and other religious activities, is an element
of religious freedom. In protecting such properties... the courts
are safeguarding the right of religious freedom.
[I]n such case there is something more than a mere trespass on
private property. ... No money standards can measure or redress
such wrongs. The continuous and uninterrupted use of church
property for the purpose to which it is dedicated is the right to
be protected.3 0
Ashworth could be read to extend protection only to the uninter-
rupted use of a place of worship, not to particular church buildings.
This reading is not compelled by the language of Ashworth, however,
and the holding that damage to church buildings is not capable of
recompense should strongly support church groups seeking to protect
their churches against compensatory condemnation proceedings. It is
serviceable precedent for raising a first amendment claim against
urban developers when the church cannot satisfy the possible sui
generis requirement of Pillar of Fire.
Zoning cases involving attempts to restrict church construction in
residential neighborhoods are numerous, and they are likely to be
seen as viable precedent when religious uses collide with renewal
projects. Although first amendment issues have been raised in some
of these cases 3 -judicial statements that religious structures enjoy
30. Id. at 165-66, 198 So. at 136 (emphasis added). Weaker precedent is
found in Vaughn v. Pansey Friendship Primitive Baptist Church, 252 Ala. 439,
41 So. 2d 403 (1949); Bailey v. Washington, 236 Ala. 674, 185 So. 172 (1938);
Guin v. Johnson, 230 Ala. 427, 161 So. 810 (1935); Christian Church v. Som-
mer, 149 Ala. 145, 43 So. 8 (1907).
31. In Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 1428 (1957), it was
stated that "[a]lthough the central issue in determining the validity of an ordi-
nance excluding churches from a zoned area would seem to be whether the re-
striction interferes with the first-amendment guarantee of freedom of religion . . .
none of the decisions invalidating these ordinances has explicitly rested on this
ground." Id. at 1436. While it is true that most zoning decisions have been based
on due process considerations, at least three cases pre-dating the Harvard Note
[Vol. 8:219
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol8/iss1/11
FIRST AMENDMENT AND URBAN RENEWAL
constitutionally protected status abound-a caveat is necessary. No
zoning case has turned on a holding that church buildings themselves
are invested with religious significance. It is the right to exercise one's
religion where one chooses that has been litigated in these cases. In
fact, zoning cases deal almost exclusively with proposed church struc-
tures, and the oft-cited judicial tag that "wherever the souls of men are
found, there the house of God belongs"32 must be viewed in this light.
In sum, there is scant precedent for the determination of whether
church buildings can be condemned for state purposes. Even when a
religious group succeeds in presenting a claim arising under the first
amendment, it is subject to the vicissitudes of the balancing require-
ment. 3 The first amendment is stated in absolute terms, but in at-
tempting to apply the amendment to disputes involving religious in-
terests the courts have frequently found themselves making vexing,
quantitative determinations of rights. Recent decisions suggest that
two factors are crucial in weighing the interests of religious claimants:
how essential are the attributes of the religion for which protection is
sought, and how direct an infringement of rights deserving first
amendment protection is involved34 Certainly the condemnation of
and several following it depend explicitly, if not entirely, on free exercise grounds.
See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 352, 172 N.E.2d 39,
45 (1961); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233
Ind. 83, 94, 117 N.E.2d 115, 120-21 (1954); Congregation Temple Israel v.
City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Mo. 1959); Community Synagogue
v. Bates, I N.Y.2d 445, 458, 136 N.E.2d 488, 496, 154 N.Y.S.2d 15, 26 (1956);
State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 12 Wis. 2d 585,
599-600, 108 N.W.2d 288, 295-96 (1961); cf. Stark's Appeal, 72 Pa. D. & C.
168 (C.P. 1950).
32. Garden City Jewish Center v. Garden City, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 1015, 155
N.Y.S.2d 523, 529 (Sup. Ct. 1956), quoting O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill.
App. 45, 51, 105 N.E.2d 917, 920 (1952).
33. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 H-thRv. L. Rv. 327
(1969); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
34. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the exemption from com-
pulsory education laws granted the Amish by the Supreme Court was based pri-
marily on the crucial finding that the Amish practice of withdrawing their chil-
dren from worldly influences, including public schools, upon their learning the
fundamentals of reading, writing and mathematics, is vitally linked to the exercise
of the Amish religion. The Court found that secondary education "contravenes
the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith," that compulsory
attendance "carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish com-
munity and religious practice," and that it would "gravely endanger if not destroy
1974]
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any usable church structure impinges upon the exercise of religion to
some degree, if only by temporarily inconveniencing the congregation;
but even under the wardship of the first amendment the claims of
religious groups seeking to protect church structures may seem pallid-
in terms of how essentially and how directly the free exercise is threat-
ened-in comparison to claims for protection of religious activities.
Against these claims are posited the interests of the state, and the
rule most often articulated is that the state must show either compel-
ling or paramount interests in order to reach the balancing stage.";
In holding that "urban renewal is a substantial state interest that can
justify taking property dedicated to religious uses,"3 0' the Pillar of Fire
court indicated that a less stringent standard must be met by the state,
an indication that should give us pause.37
But if the Pillar of Fire court missed the established mark in al-
lowing a merely substantial state interest to propel DURA into the
balancing stage, and if the court was overly broad and unpersuasive
in stating that church property is private property for the purposes of
the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." Id. at 218-19. In Carpenters
Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 726 (1942), Justice Frankfurter, quot-
ing Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Mfinnesota ex tel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708
(1931), said: "Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of 'liberty,' the
question always is whether the state has violated 'the essential attributes of that
liberty.'" (Emphasis added.) See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
35. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963): "The decisions of this
Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest . . . can justify
limiting First Amendment freedoms." Accord, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("[T]he State may prevail only upon showing a subordi-
nating interest which is compelling."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945) ("Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation."); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643-44
(1943); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rowland v.
Sigler, 321 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Neb. 1971). But cf. Holmes v. Silver Cross
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
36 . . Colo. at ............. 509 P.2d at 1253 (emphasis added).
37. It would appear that the court might easily have found a compelling or
paramount state interest here. On the necessity of urban renewal it said:
Planned and well thought out redevelopment of our cities is essential to the
future success and well-being of our country. Urban slums and blighted areas
suffocate the spirit of the inhabitants in the cities and force them to leave
to seek a more acceptable environment in which to live . . . . [Large-scale
overall planning is necessary to restore health to the cities an[ to prevent
slums from expanding to enlarge the cycle of decay.
Id. at ........... ., 509 P.2d at 1251.
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eminent domain, it yet took a somewhat bold, affirmative stance in
allowing Pillar of Fire to raise the first amendment issue. The decision
in Pillar of Fire should put urban planners on notice that they may
find themselves laboring under substantial burdens of proof when
they attempt to condemn churches, possibly even when the churches
are less unique than Memorial Hall. It is a decision that should be
most favorably received by religious groups and constitutionalists, for
the Supreme Court of Colorado has diminished the severity of the
major obstacle-adequately raising a first amendment issue-facing
religious claimants seeking to protect their churches. Perhaps most
importantly, the decision stands well with our history of reverence
for traditional forms of religious worship.
Arthur S. Kahn
Washington University Open Scholarship
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